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Treasure hunters today are forced to battle not only the perils of the
sea, but also the powers of government. This note examines whether
ownership of an abandoned "derelict" and its treasure found by a trea-
sure hunter outside the territorial limits of a state should be awarded to
the treasure hunter or to the state. A trilogy of cases in the United
States courts have recently held that the treasure hunter owns the trea-
sure.' A closely related question arises if the derelict and its treasure
are located within state territorial waters (the so-called three-mile
limit). The Florida Supreme Court has held that the treasure is owned
by the state if located within its jurisdiction,2 but the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida has recently raised
doubts about the validity of the supreme court's conclusion.3 This latter,
issue is certain to be hotly contested in the near future.4
In the midst of this controversy, federal legislation has been pro-
posed. A bill pending in Congress, if passed, would vest title to certain
shipwrecks and their treasure in the United States Government.1 The
future of this bill could have a significant impact on the current litiga-
tion and mark significant changes in existing treasure law.
1. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked And Abandoned Sailing
Vessel Believed To Be The Nuestra Sefiora de Atocha, 408 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla.
1976), modified, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Treasure Salvors
#1]. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked And Abandoned Sailing Ves-
sel Believed To Be The Nuestra Sefiora de Atocha, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978) [here-
inafter cited as Treasure Salvors #2]. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified
Wrecked And Abandoned Sailing Vessel Believed To Be The Nuestra Sefiora de
Atocha, 459 F.Supp. 507 (S.D. Fla. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Treasure Salvors #3].
2. State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1956), cert. de-
nied. 355 U.S. 881 (1957).
3. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 509.
4. Cobb Coin Co. v. The Unidentified Wrecked And Abandoned Sailing Vessel
Believed To Be The Almirante, No. 79-8266-CIV-JLK (S.D. Fla., filed August 17,
1979) [hereinafter cited as Cobb Coin Co. v. The Almirante].
5. H.R. 1195, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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BACKGROUND: NUESTRA SEf4ORA DE ATOCHA
In the year 1622, Spain was supreme. Her economy was soaring
with the wealth of gold and silver being mined in the "New World."
King Philip IV regularly dispatched two fleets to transport this wealth
safely home over seas teeming with buccaneers and pirates. The vice-
flagship of the fleet which sailed between Spain and northern South
America was named Nuestra Sehora de A tocha.
On the moring of September 4th, the A tocha and her twenty-eight
sister ships sailed out of Havana, homeward bound. The Atocha was
hauling a magnificent treasure in gold, silver and jewelry-perhaps, in
present worth, a treasure exceeding a half-billion dollars.' Two days
later, helplessly situated in the Straits of Florida, the ships were be-
sieged by a hurricane which hurled them mercilessly back onto the
coral reefs near the Florida Keys. Aground and awash, the fleet was
battered and broken. Five hundred and fifty drowned, and the immense
treasure was lost.7
In early June, 1971, Mel Fisher, founder and president of Trea-
sure Salvors, Inc., discovered the first clue in his five-year search for
the Atocha; a single lead musket ball was retrieved from the ocean
floor. Two weeks later, mid-June, a diver found a lone silver coin; later
that day, another discovered a piece of a huge ancient anchor. Then,
incredibly, a diver surfaced with gold-eight long feet of delicate gold
chain. And with that, at last, a tiny part of Nuestra Sehora de Atocha
glittered again in the warm rays of the tropical sun.8
But almost before having had a chance to dry upon the ship's
deck, the treasure was seized by Florida's Division of Archives. Previ-
ously, under threats of arrest, Fisher had been coerced into signing a
6. According to records kept by the House of Trade in 1622, the A tocha carried
901 silver bars (70 lbs. ea.), 250,000 pieces of eight, and 161 items in registered gold
(216.5 lbs.). It is estimated that a similar amount was stowed away in contraband. R.
DALEY, TREASURE 23 (1977). Current estimated value has reached $600,000,000. Lyon,
The Trouble With Treasure, 149 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 787 (June, 1976).
7. The A tocha was located two weeks after the disaster, but subsequent salvage
attempts failed. Three attempts were launched during the following three years, but the
Atocha was never located again. See Lyon, supra note 6, at 84-90.
8. Other items retrieved shortly thereafter were: swords, daggers, cannonballs,
matchlock muskets, spoons, cups, pewter plates, rings, medallions, a delicate rosary,
cannons, an astrolabe, and navigational dividers. See Lyon, supra note 6, at 787.
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"salvage contract" with the state.' The contract provided that in ex-
change for Treasure Salvors' right to explore certain underwater areas
(assumed,to be state-owned lands), the state would be allowed to keep,
and, at its pleasure divide, all cargo or wreckage salvaged by Treasure
Salvors, the state retaining twenty-five percent and Treasure Salvors
eventually getting the rest. l°
For the next four years, until early 1975, Fisher's company contin-
ued salvaging the Atocha, entirely at its own expense;" and the state
continued, in "bad faith," seizing and hoarding the treasure.'2 Then, in
March of 1975, the United States Supreme Court, in an unrelated
case, determined that Florida's boundaries did not encompass the site
of the A tocha.13 It thus became clear that the "salvage contract" be-
tween Treasure Salvors, Inc. and Florida was unenforceable since the
Atocha lay in international waters" leaving Florida with no claim to
9. Pursuant to Florida Archives and History Act, FLA. STAT. § 267.031 (1975):
"(5) The division may make and enter into all contrcts and agreements. . ....
"The coercive acts of the Division of Archives in threatening arrest and confisca-
tion voids the contract under the general maritime law." Treasure Salvors #3 459
F.Supp. at 520.
10. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 511.
11. Other than placing an agent on Fisher's boat to oversee the work, the State
of Florida made no contribution in money or personnel to the salvage expedition. See
R. DALEY, supra note 6, at 131.
12. It is basic to a maritime contract that the parties act in good faith. The
state's use of coercion to acquire contractual rights, refusal to divide the salvaged trea-
sure, compounded by the Division of Archives' arrangement with the United States
Government to obtain an antiquities permit if the United States was successful in its
claim against the treasure is strong evidence of the "bad faith scheme" devised by the
State of Florida. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 521-22.
13. Following a report of the special master, the Supreme Court set forth "the
respective rights of the United States and the State of Florida in lands, minerals and
resources underlying both the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico." United States
v. Florida, 425 U.S. 791 (1976).
14. The contract failed on several gounds:
(1) Mutual mistake of fact - both parties believed the Atocha was located
within state territorial waters.
(2) Lack of consideration - Florida tendered nothing since it lacked authoriza-
tion to contract regarding the salvage of a vessel outside the state's territorial
sovereignty.
(3) Bad faith - on behalf of the state rendering the maritime contract void.
(4) Contract terms - provision to render the contract void if the state's title
failed.
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the treasure. Accordingly, Fisher promptly filed suit in federal district
court against the A tocha, claiming Treasure Salvors, Inc. owners as
against the entire world.1 5 The Florida Department of Archives, power-
less to stop Fisher, requested the United States Department of Justice
to intervene, urging them to claim ownership of the treasure. The
United States obliged; and the fundamental issue of this paper was laid
before the court: Whether ownership of an abandoned "derelict"' 6 (the
A tocha) and its treasure, found by a treasure hunter (Treasure Salvors,
Inc.) outsi-le the territorial limits of the state (the United States),
should be awarded to the treasure hunter or to the state.17
TREASURE SALVORS #1
On what grounds could the United States possibly claim the trea-
sure? After all, Treasure Salvors had found the treasure and salvaged it
entirely at its own expense without any help from the government. 8
Furthermore, the A tocha and her treasure lay in international waters,
outside the reach of any government. Admittedly, a United States At-
torney quipped, "We've got to hustle around and see if we can find
enough law to get our guys in."' 9
The United, States eventually based its claim on the doctrine of
Immediately following oral argument in United States v. Florida, Treasure Salvors
notified Florida of the contract's nullity. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 513.
15. Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F.Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1976), modified, 569 F.2d
330 (5th Cir. 1978).
16. Special terminology is applied in maritime law to property "lost" at sea. The
term "wreck" refers to property lost at sea which has washed ashore. "Flotsam" refers
to the same property which remains afloat. "Jetsam" refers to property purposely
thrown overboard in an attempt to save a foundering vessel. When buoyed in order to
be retrieved at a later time, this property is labelled "ligan." Vessels lying at the bot-
tom of the sea, as the A tocha, are called "derelicts." Kenny and Hrusoff, The Owner-
ship Of The Treasures Of The Sea, 9 WM. & MARY L.REv. 383, 384 (1967). See also
Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1360, 1365.
17. Both the United States and Treasure Salvors, Inc. agreed "the site of the
wreck is on the continental shelf but outside the territorial waters of the United
States." Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F.Supp. at 909.
18. It took six years of research and diving expeditions and an expenditure in
excess of $2,000,000 to locate the Atocha. Unfortunately, the cost was measured not
only in time and money; it emcompassed four lives, including Fisher's son and daugh-
ter-in-law. Lyon, note 6 supra.
19. 189 SCIENCE 1070 (September 26, 1975).
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"sovereign prerogative,""0 "a common law notion derived from the
right of the King of England to objects recovered from the sea by his
subjects."'" The government contended the doctrine of sovereign pre-
rogative had been legislatively asserted by Congress through the enact-
ment of the Antiquities Act2 and the Abandoned Property Act. 23 The
district court in subsequent litigation, Treasure Salvors #3, character-
ized this claim as "flimsy. ' 24
Dealing first with the Abandoned Property Act, which applies to
property "which may have been wrecked, abandoned, or become dere-
lict,"" the court noted that it had long been decided that the Act re-
ferred only to property"strewn about the country and its harbors dur-
ing the Civil War. ' 26 Clearly, the Atocha was not within its purview.
The Antiquities Act, in similar fashion, purports to apply to "any
historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or to any object of antiq-
uity. 127 But this Act, the court pointed out, "has been held to be un-
20. Also known as the "English Rule." For an in-depth analysis of the develop-
ment of the English Rule, see 9 WM & MARY L.REv., note 16 supra.
21. Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F.Supp. at 909.
22. Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 432, 433 (1970). See note 27 infra.
23. Abandoned Property Act, 40 U.S.C. § 310 (1970). See note 25 infra.
24. "It would amaze and surprise most citizens of this country, when their
dream, at the greatest of costs, was realized, that agents of respective governments
would, on the most flimsy of grounds, lay claim to the treasure." Treasure Salvors #3,
459 F.Supp. at 509.
25. 40 U.S.C. § 310 (1970):
The administrator of General Services is authorized to make such contracts and
provisions as he may deem for the interest of the Government for the preserva-
tion, sale, or collection of any property, or the proceeds thereof, which may have
been wrecked, abandoned, or become derelict, being within the jurisdiction of the
United States, and which ought to come to the United States, and in such con-
tracts to allow such compensation to any person giving information thereof, or
who shall actually preserve, collect, surrender, or pay over the same, as the Ad-
ministrator of General Services may deem just and reasonable. No costs or
claim shall, however, become chargeable to the United States in so obtaining,
preserving, collecting, receiving, or making available property, debts, dues, or
interests, which shall not be paid from such moneys as shall be realized and
received from the property so collected, under each specific agreement.
26. Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F.Supp. at 909, discussing Russel v. Forty Bales
Cotton, 21 Fed.Cas. No. 12, 154 (1872).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 432 (1970). This section provides in part: "Permits for the exam-
ination of ruins, the excavation of archeaological sites, and the gathering of objects of
antiquity upon the lands under their respective jurisdictions may be granted by the
241 1
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constitutionally vague."2 Moreover, both the Antiquities Act and the
Abandoned Property Act apply only to property found within the juris-
diction of the United States. 9 The A tocha, lying on the outer continen-
tal shelf beyond territorial waters was plainly beyond the reach of the
United States; thus, neither Act could apply to it.3°
But the United States asserted the A tocha was within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States through the use of the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).3 ' The court rejected this argument since
"this statute [OSCLA] merely asserts jurisdiction over the minerals in
and under the continental shelf."' 32 Additionally, the court noted, even
Secretaries of the Interior . ... "
16 U.S.C. § 433 (1970). This section provides:
Any person who shall appropriate, excavate, injure, or destroy any historic or
prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of antiquity, situated on lands
owned or controlled by the Government of the United States, without the per-
mission of the Secretary of the Department of the Government having jurisdic-
tion over the lands on which said antiquities are situated, shall, upon conviction,
be fined in a sum of not more than $500 or be imprisoned for a period of not
more than ninety days, or shall suffer both fine and imprisonment, in the discre-
tion of the court.
28. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 524-25, citing United States v. Diaz,
499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974). Congress has recently passed legislation in an attempt to
cure the statute's vagueness problem. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of
1979, 16 U.S.C.A. § 470aa (Supp. 1979). Additionally, subsequent to the district
court's decision, the Antiquities Act did survive a vagueness attack in the Tenth Cir-
cuit. United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 84
(1974). See note 99 infra.
29. The pertinent part of the Antiquities Act states "situated on lands owned or
controlled by the Government of the United States." For complete text, see note 27
supra.
30. Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F.Supp. at 909.
31. Id. at 910. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (1953):
(a) It is declared to be the policy of the United States that the subsoil and
seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States and are
subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition as provided in this
subchapter.
(b) This subchapter shall be construed in such manner that the character as
high seas of the waters above the outer Continental Shelf and the right to navi-
gation and fishing therein shall not be affected.
See also Guess v. Read, 290 F.2d 622, 625 (1961), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1962) for
a more detailed analysis of this Act.
32. Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F.Supp. at 910.
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if OCSLA did extend the jurisdiction of the United States over
wrecked ships, it would be invalid because it would conflict with the
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.3 3 And, the court pointed
out, the International Law Commission, in its report on the Geneva
Convention stated: "It is clearly understood that the rights in question
do not cover objects such as wrecked ships and their cargoes (including
bullion) lying on the seabed or covered by the sand of the subsoil.' 4
Thus, having considered and rejected each aspect of the United
States' "hustled" sovereign prerogative theory, the district court
granted Treasure Salvors' motion for summary judgment, declaring it
the new owner of the Atocha and her treasure as against the whole
world.3
TREASURE SALVORS #2
The United States appealed. In addition to reasserting its claim
that Congress had legislatively asserted sovereign prerogative through
the Abandoned Property Act and the Antiquities Act, the government
also contended that a legislative assertion of the doctrine was not nec-
essary.3 The Fifth Circuit rejected these arguments (and others raised
by the government which are not pertinent here)3 7 and affirmed the
33. "The Convention on the Continental Shelf became effective as law in the
United States eleven years after passage of the Outer Continental Shelf LandsAct and
superceded any incompatible terminology in the domestic statute." Treasure Salvors
#2, 569 F.2d at 340, citing United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16, 21 (5th Cir. 1970).
Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, in force June 10, 1964. Article 2, subsection 1 states: "The coastal
State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring
it and exploiting its natural resources."
34. Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 340, citing I 1 U.S. GAOR, Supp. 9 at 42,
U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956).
35. Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F. Supp. at 911.
36. Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 341.
37. The United States Government raised three procedural arguments in addi-
tion to the substantive claims. The government claimed: (1) the federal district court
lacked jurisdiction since the wreck was outside the territorial waters; (2) summary
judgment was improper due to the existence of two unresolved factual questions; and,
(3) salvage law was inappropriately applied. The Fifth Circuit held jurisdiction was
proper since the government by intervening and by stipulating to the court's admiralty
jurisdiction had waived the usual requirement that the res be present. The issues un-
resolved were not questions of fact, but concerned administrative or legislative action,
243 11 4:1980
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district court's decision, though modifying it slightly.
As to the purported assertion of sovereign prerogative through the
Antiquities and Abandoned Property Acts, the Fifth Circuit adopted
the reasoning of the district court; the Acts clearly applied only to cer-
tain property within the jurisdiction of the United States."8 Any exten-
sion of United States' jurisdiction beyond the three-mile limit by the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act was obviously only "for the pur-
pose of exploring the area and exploiting its natural resources."39 Since
the A tocha was outside the three-mile limit and, obviously, not a "nat-
ural resource," the Antiquities and Abandoned Property Acts were
again held inapplicable.
The court also rejected the government's claim that sovereign pre-
rogative need not be legislatively asserted." The government had ar-
gued that sovereign prerogative was a part of American maritime law
because "a number of the royal colonies" had asserted "certain prerog-
ative rights" to abandoned property found within their jurisdiction.4"
The court disagreed: "[T]he notion of sovereign prerogative never took
root in America."" To substantiate its ruling, the court went on to cite
cases and authorities for the inapposite "American Rule," which has
been "widely recognized by courts and writers."4
therefore, summary judgment was appropriate. Finally, the lower court had applied the
law of finds rather than salvage law which was appropriate. Salvage law only differs to
the extent the court sells the vessel and pays the salvor from the proceeds. The law of
finds awards title to the finder. It is not unusual under salvage law, however, for the
salvor to receive "the entire derelict property." Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 335-
37.
38. Id. at 341.
39. Id. at 339. See note 31 supra regarding the Convention on the Continental
Shelf. See also President Truman's proclamation of September 28, 1945 stating in
part: "IT]he Government of the United States regards the natural resources of the
subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the
coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States . . . ." Presidential
Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945).
40. Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 343.
41. Id. at 342.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 343, citing United States v. Tyndale, 116 F. 820, 822-23 (1st Cir.
1902), Russel v. Proceeds of Forty Bales Cotton, 21 Fed. Cas. No. 12,154, pp. 42, 45-
50 (S.D. Fla. 1872), affd. 21 Fed. Cas. p. 50; In re Moneys in Registry, 170 F. 470,
475 (E.D. Pa. 1909), and Thompson v. United States, 62 Ct. Cl. 516, 624 (1926).
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This American Rule was Treasure Salvors' ally to the end. In di-
rect conflict with the "English Rule" (sovereign prerogative), the
American Rule vests title to lost or abandoned goods in the finder."1
The case law in America overwhelmingly adopts this rule."5 Only a mi-
nority of the state courts, most notably the Florida Supreme Court,"
have ever purported to adopt the English Rule of sovereign preroga-
tive. The highly criticized Florida decision will be dealt with below. At
this point, it is only important to note that Fisher's ownership of the
A tocha and her treasure was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. The only
modification of the district court's decision was that Treasure Salvors'
title to the Atocha was not binding on those not parties or privies to
the suit." Remarkably, the Florida Division of Archives took this mod-
ification as an invitation to lay yet another claim to the treasure."
TREASURE SALVORS #3
The Division of Archives had never released the treasure it had
seized and collected from Treasure Salvors since the day of the first
musket ball. Accordingly, to effectuate the Fifth Circuit's mandate, the
District Court for the Southern District of Florida issued an ancillary
warrant to compel the Division of Archives to release Fisher's
treasure. 9
The Division of Archives alleged that the district court lacked ju-
risdiction to issue the warrant," and, additionally claimed sovereign
44. For the history and a discussion of the American Rule, see 9 WM & MARY
L.REv., note 16 supra.
45. See cases cited in note 43 supra.
46. State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1956), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 881 (1957).
47. This modification was necessary since only "constructive possession" was at-
tained over the wreck site and the treasure yet undiscovered. "The district court prop-
erly adjudicated title to all those objects within its territorial jurisdiction and to those
objects without its territory as between plaintiffs and the United States." Treasure Sal-
vors #2, 569 F.2d at 335-36.
48. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. 507 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
49. "In order to effectuate the mandate of the Fifth Circuit, and carry out the
judgment of this Court, a warrant for arrest was issued to seize certain salvaged arti-
cles in the possession of the Division of Arichives, History and Records Management,
Department of State, State of Florida .... " Id. at 508-09.
50. Id. at 509.
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immunity under the elventh amendment.5' Furthermore, it claimed not
to have been in privity with the United States in the two previous law-
suits, and asserted ownership of the treasure on two grounds: the old
"salvage contract" with Fisher; and like the United States before it,
Florida maintained it had a sovereign prerogative to the treasure which
had been legislatively asserted by section 267.061 of the Florida
Statutes .52
The jurisdictional and sovereign immunity arguments were
brushed aside by the district court;53 but the Division of Archives' priv-
ity argument, an attempt to "paint itself as a total stranger to the liti-
gation,"54 drew scathing criticism from the court. Citing Florida's high
degree of participation in the previous litigation," the court wrote: "It
ill behooves the Division of Archives to play such a fast and loose
game with the courts. For all practical purposes, the Division of
Archives was a party in fact, although not technically in name, to the
litigation." 5 Thus, since Florida was in privity to the previous litiga-
tion, it followed that, as between Treasure Salvors, Florida, and the
United States, Treasure Salvors' claim to ownership of the A tocha and
her treasure was supreme. And that should have been the end of it; but,
gratuitously, the court went on to consider Florida's contract claim and
sovereign prerogative theory."
51. Id. The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
52. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 522.
53. The Division of Archives challenged the Southern District Court's authority
to issue a warrant of arrest against items removed to the Northern District. The war-
rant was ancillary to the court's established jurisdiction over the res originally arrested
in the Southern District and, therefore, a valid exercise of jurisdiction. Further, the
State claimed sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment, claiming this was an
independent action against the state. Senior District Judge Mehrtens was 'swift to state
that the eleventh amendment "is not a sword whereby agents of the State can take and
appropriate the property and lives of its citizens without due process." Id. at 528.
54. Id. at 513.
55. Florida had loaned an attorney to the federal government to work on the
case, and the Division of Archives had begun preliminary negotiations with the United
States regarding the disposition of the treasure if the government won. Id. at 514.
56. Id. at 513.
57. Having established the State was in privity, the Division of Archives was
10
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The court's rationale for rejecting any possible claim to the trea-
sure which the State may have had via its "salvage contract" with
Treasure Salvors has been discussed above. 8 The State's further con-
tention, that section 267.06111 gave it a sovereign prerogative to the
A tocha, was refuted by the court on three grounds:
(1) Like the Abandoned Property Act and the Antiquities Act, sec-
tion 267.061 applies only to property located on "sovereignty lands of
the state;""0
(2) 0 Like the Antiquities Act, the statute is unconstitutionally vague;"'
and
(3) Most significantly, the statute unconstitutionally purports to give a
state jurisdiction over maritime matters-a subject under exclusive fed-
eral control. 2
Since Florida Statute section 267.061 is also the primary authority
under which the state asserts its claim to wrecks and derelicts found
within its territorial waters, this dictum is certain to be raised in
future litigation.
However, the controversy over the A tocha's treasure is not yet set-
tled. Despite the district court's finding that the Division of Archives
was bound by the Fifth Circuit's earlier decision, and its rejection of
bound by the prior judgment and could no longer assert any claim to the treasure. The
judge, however, continued to evaluate the State's arguments. Id.
58. For a discussion of the contract's flaws, see note 14 supra.
59. Archives and History Act, FLA. STAT. § 267.061 (1975) reads in part:
(1)(a) It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the state to protect and
preserve historic sites and properties. . . sunken or abandoned ships. . . or any
part thereof relating to the history, government and culture of the state.
(l)(b) It is further declared to be the public policy of the state that all treasure
trove, artifacts and such objects having intrinsic or historical and archeaological
value which have been abandoned on state-owned lands or state-owned sover-
eignty submerged lands shall belong to the state with the title thereto vested in
the Division of Archives, History, and Records Manageient of the Department
of State for the purpose of administration and protection.
60. "state-owned lands or state-owned sovereignty submerged lands . . . ." id.
61. "In the alternative, Ch. 267.061 Fla. Stat. is unconstitutional based upon the
holding in United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974) noted with apparent
approval of the Fifth Circuit in this case. 569 F.2d at 340." Treasure Salvors #3, 459
F. Supp. at 524. But see note 99 supra.
62. "The application of Chapter 267, Florida Statutes, to wrecked and aban-
doned vessels is beyond the state's power as it is maritime in nature."Id. at 525.
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the state's claim under section 267.061, the state appealed this decision
to the Fifth Circuit. 3 The treasure remains in the possession of the
Division of Archives.
After seven years of litigation, it appears that Senior District
Judge Mehrtens was indeed correct when he wrote: "As grave as the
perils of the sea are and were, the gravest perils to the treasure itself
came not from the sea but from two unlikely sources. Agents of two
governments, Florida and the United States ....""
UPCOMING LITIGATION: TREASURE WITHIN
FLORIDA'S THREE-MILE LIMIT
Florida has traditionally claimed title to all "sunken or abandoned
ships" on "state-owned sovereignty submerged lands." 5 That is why
Fisher, when searching for the A tocha, originally entered the salvage
contract with the State; both parties had erroneously assumed he was
exploring state-owned submerged lands. Having apparently won owner-
ship of the A tocha, Fisher has now gone back into court to play "a
new game of hardball with state officials."" Fisher's new corporation,
Cobb Coin Company, Inc., is claiming title to the Almirante, a 1715
shipwreck which it claims it discovered. The Almirante, unlike the
A tocha, is just a quarter mile off Florida's coast in about eighteen feet
of water, well within the three-mile territorial limit."
If Florida lbses this suit, it would lose the right to protect hun-
dreds of treasure ships which officials have been preserving for study by
state institutions when money can be found to fund the treasure
hunts. 6 According to Sonny Cockrell, Florida's outspoken underwater
archeologist, a loss in this suit would "signal an end to all shipwreck
law in our State."" Fisher countered, "I don't think the State has any
right to be in the treasure salvage business. That should be left to pri-
63. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked And Abandoned Sailing
Vessel Believed To Be The Nuestra Senora de Atocha, No. 78-2950 (5th Cir., Argued
December 4, 1979).
64. Treasure Salvors #2, 459 F.Supp. at 511.
65. FLA. STAT. § 267.061, (1975) note 59 supra.
66. The Fort Lauderdale News, August 16, 1979, § A, at 5, col. 1.
67. Id.
68. The Miami Herald, August 24, 1979, § D, at 1, 10, col. 2.
69. The Fort Lauderdale News, note 55 supra.
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vate enterprise. '70
Accordingly, Fisher has filed suit against the Almirante in the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida.71 Almost
certainly, both Florida and the United States will intervene and claim
ownership. As previously mentioned, doubt has been cast on the valid-
ity of Florida's claim, even to sunken ships well within its territorial
waters, as a result of the dictum contained in the district court's deci-
sion in Treasure Salvors #3, and general principles of maritime law.
Florida's claim to "sunken or abandoned ships" within state terri-
torial waters must be based primarily on section 267.061 of the Florida
"Statutes. 2But, according to the district court in Treasure Salvors #3,
"the application of chapter 267, Florida Statutes, to wrecked and
abandoned vessels is beyond the state's power as it is maritime in na-
ture. '73 This dictum is apparently an accurate characterization of the
present state of admiralty law in this area.
While states certainly have the authority to enact laws which may
have some effect on maritime affairs; no state can enact laws which
"contravene any acts of Congress, nor work any prejudice to the char-
acteristic features of the maritime law, nor interfere with its proper
harmony and uniformity in its international and interstate relations. '74
The application of this tripartite analysis to Florida Statute section
267.061, presents a strong argument against its constitutionality.
The first question proposed by the tripartite test is whether the
state statute conflicts with any federal statute. This paper has already
discussed the federal Abandoned Property Act and Antiquities Act.75
Obviously, only the Antiquities Act could apply to the Almirante, since
the Abandoned Property Act is limited to Civil War artifacts.76 Does
Florida Statute section 267.061 conflict with the Antiquities Act? This
is a question of statutory interpretation to be decided by the courts;
but, to the extent that each statute would purport to vest control over
the Almirante in different governments, it seems clear the statutes do
70. The Miami Herald, note 57 supra.
71. Cobb Coin Co. v. The Almirante, note 4 supra.
72. For the text of FLA. STAT. § 267.061, see note 59 supra.
73. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 525.
74. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 339 (1973);
The Friendship II, 312 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
75. See notes 22 through 29 and accompanying text supra.
76. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
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conflict." If so, the Florida statute would be invalid; and the State's
claim to the Almirante would fail. 78
A recently enacted bill, H.R. 1825, the "Archaeological Resources
Protection Act of 1979," is an amendment to the "vague" Antiquities
Act.7 This new law vests title in the United States to all "archaeologi-
cal resources" found on "public lands." For an abandoned shipwreck
to fall within the Bill's broad terms it would have to be viewed as "ma-
terial remains of past human . . . activities which are of archaeological
interest" and be "at least one hundred years of age."" ° Arguably, even
with this amendment, the Antiquities Act is still unconstitutionally
vague as applied to shipwrecks. The law also ambiguously defines
"public lands," inter alia, as "all other lands the fee title to which is
held by the United States other than lands on the outer Continental
Shelf.""
The second point to consider is whether the state statute conflicts
with the "characteristic features of the maritime law."82 As previously
77. Compare the Antiquities Act at note 27 supra to FLA. STAT. § 267.061 at
note 59 supra.
78. This analysis presupposes the Antiquities Act is itself a valid statute. But the
Antiquities Act may be unconstitutionally vague. See note 99 infra. Thus, perhaps the
Florida statute does not conflict with a valid federal statute. The point is moot, how-
ever, since the next "test" indicates that the Florida statute unquestionably conflicts
with the principles of general maritime law. Moreover, if the Antiquities Act is vague
so is the Florida statute. See note 91 and note 99 and accompanying text infra.
79. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 470aa et
seq. (Supp. 1979).
80. Id.
81. It is interesting to note the ambiguity found in the definition of "public
lands," which reads in part: "(B) all other lands the fee title to which is held by the
United States other than lands on the Outer Continental Shelf." 16 U.S.C.A. § 470bb
(3) (Supp. 1979). Does this exclude the Outer Continental Shelf entirely, or does it
include it with the exception of only requiring fee title to the other lands mentioned?
82. "The Constitution of the United States, Art. 3, Sec. 2, has been interpreted
to include a grant to the courts to declare the general maritime law auid to supplement
it-a true legislative role." Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 529. Or, as explained
by Professors Black and Gilmore,
The "general" maritime law in the United States, insofar as it remains unmodi-
fied by statute, contains . . . two parts. First, is the corpus of traditional rules
and concepts found by our courts in the European authorities . . . . Second are
rules and concepts improvised to fit the needs of this country, including, of
course, modifications of the first component.
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explained, the general maritime law in this matter is the "American
Rule," i.e., the finder is entitled to the ownership of his discovery.83
Florida's statute clearly conflicts with this rule, and would, therefore,
appear to be invalid by this analysis. 4
The final consideration is whether the state statute interferes with
the "harmony and uniformity" of maritime law in its interstate or in-
ternational relations.8" Were this the sole test for determining the status
of Florida's statute, it would probably be valid. The statute applies
only to "sunken or abandoned ships" sedentarily situated within the
state's territorial waters.88 It is not the kind of statute which may affect
commercial shipping, or ships sailing from port to port among the
states. The statute is inherently local in nature." As such, it does not
lend itself to disrupting the harmony of maritime law in its interstate
relations. Nevertheless, this issue need not be further discussed since
the statute appears to conflict with general principles of maritime law,
and is probably in conflict with the federal Antiquities Act. Thus, as
the district court noted in Treasure Salvors #3, Florida Statute section
267.061, is probably invalid, and an unconstitutional usurpation of fed-
eral power by the state.8
In addition to chapter 267, two other Florida statutes also argua-
GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 47 (2d ed. 1974).
83. See notes 43 and 45 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the
American Rule and the inapposite English Rule, see Kenny & Hrusoff, The Ownership
of the Treasures of the Sea, 9 WM. & MARY L.REv. 383 (1967).
84. Florida's statute would award title of the Almirante to the state. General
maritime law would award the Almirante to Treasure Salvors, its finder.
85. This desire for national uniformity is the underlying reason for the existence
of federal admiralty law. See Stevens, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Uniform Gen-
eral Maritime Law, 64 HARV. L.REv. 246, 247-57 (1950).
86. See note 59 supra.
87. "[S]tates may legislate freely on shipping matters that are of predominantly
local concern, but. . . they may not so act as to interfere with the uniform working of
the federal maritime legal system." GILMORE & BLACK, see note 82 supra, at 50. For
an example of a Florida statute which was upheld by the United States Supreme Court
on similar grounds, see Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941). Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes, writing for the Court, observed: "It is also clear that Florida has an interest in
the proper maintenance of the sponge fishery and that the statute so far as applied to
conduct within the territorial waters of Florida, in the absence of conflicting federal
legislation, is within the police power of the State." Id. at 75.
88. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 525.
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bly vest title in the state to abandoned vessels found within its territo-
rial waters, sections 2.019 and 705.01.11 To the extent that they too
purport to govern maritime matters, they, like section 267.061, may
be unconstitutional. Notwithstanding their potential invalidity in this
respect, each of the three statutes also suffers at least one potential de-
fect on other grounds. 1 Thus, a claim by the state based on its legisla-
tion may not be successful.
However, the Florida Supreme Court has held that title to an
abandoned vessel located in state territorial waters vests in the state,
not in the salvor." In State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., the
89. FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1975) provides:
Common law and certain statutes declared in force.- The common and statute
laws of England which are of a general and not a local nature, with the exception
hereinafter mentioned, down to the 4th day of July, 1776, are declared to be of
force in this state; provided, the said statutes and common law be not inconsis-
tent, with the constitution and laws of the United States and the acts of the
legislature of this state.
This statute was applied in State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So.2d 902 (Fla.
1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 881 (1957).
90. FLA. STAT. § 705.01 (1978) provides: County court judge to order sale.-
(1) Whenever any wrecked derelict goods or abandoned motor vehicle, or other
personal property shall be found in any county in this state, the county judge
shall ascertain the amount and situation of the same and by his written order
shall cause the sheriff to take charge thereof and sell the same at public outcry,
after giving a reasonable public notice of the time and place of such sale. (em-
phasis supplied).
91. FLA. STAT. § 267.061 was declared unconstitutionally vague in Treasure Sal-
vors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 525.
FLA. STAT. §2.01, which incorporates the English common law as of 1776, should
not apply to "derelicts." While this chapter was used by the Florida Supreme Court in
the case of State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co. to apply sovereign prerogative to a
derelict, it should be noted that England had not extended this doctrine to derelicts
until 1798 in the Aquila, 165 Eng. Rep. 87 (Adm. 1798). 9 Wm. & MARY L.REv.,
supra note 16, at 390.
FLA. STAT. §705.01 authorizes the sale of wrecked derelict goods found within a
county. This provision may conflict with section 715.01 which vests title in the finder of
personal property found "in or upon public conveyances, premises at the time used for
business purposes . . . and other places open to the public . . . unless the same be
called for or claimed by the rightful owner thereof within 6 months after the finding
thereof." FLA. STAT. § 715.01 (1975). State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95
So.2d at 908 (dissenting opinion).
92. State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So.2d at 908.
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supreme court adopted the doctrine of sovereign prerogative. A battle-
ship, the Massachusetts, had been sunk and abandoned by the United
States in 1922, approximately 1.2 miles off the Florida coast. Thirty-
four years later in 1956, the defendant Massachusetts Co. began sal-
vaging the remains of the ship. The state sought to enjoin the salvage
operations by claiming ownership of the Massachusetts. The injunction
was denied, but the supreme court reversed on appeal. In addition to
granting the injunction, the court held that the state owned the ship in
its capacity as sovereign. 3
Whether the supreme court ever had jurisdiction to decide the is-
sue of ownership, a maritime matter, is questionable. Although federal
admiralty jurisdiction is not exclusive, it is exclusive "to those mari-
time causes of action begun and carried on as proceedings in rem
... 1" "It is this kind of in rem proceeding which state courts can-
not entertain. '9 5 Thus, it is probable that the Florida Supreme Court
did not have jurisdiction to decide the issue of ownership. Regardless,
to the extent that this case purports to be law which determines the
ownership of abandoned vessels, it too may be invalid, like Florida
Statute section 267.061, as an unconstitutional usurpation of federal
power by the siate.11 Thus, Florida's claim to the Almirante is, at best,
tenuous, based on potentially invalid legislation and questionable case
law.
If Florida's claim fails, what of the United States' claim? 7 The
United States will probably rely on the Antiquities Act; 8 this Act,
93. "[W]e hold that the State of Florida, in its sovereign capacity, has a posses-
sory right or title to the wreck of the Massachusetts superior to that of the Company
." Id. at 908.
94. Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560 (1953). The question then
becomes: Was the cause of action in State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co. a pro-
ceeding in rem? The state sought an injunction, thereby acquiring valid state court
jurisdiction. The court, however, granted not only this relief, but declared title in the
State of Florida. The state could enjoin all subsequent salvagers and, in essence, ac-
complish the same result as an in rem action.
95. Id. at 560. Federal court jurisdiction is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976).
96. See notes 74 through 88 and accompanying text supra.
97. This assumes the United States will intervene. Certainly, Florida will assert a
claim.
98. Since the Almirante is located within territorial waters the Antiquities Act
may apply. See note 27 supra.
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however, is arguably unconstitutionally vague."9 The Abandoned Prop-
erty Act has been held to be limited to Civil War matters; and, there-
fore, is inapplicable.' Presently, no other federal legislation exists
which might apply to this case. Clearly, since there is a lack of applica-
ble federal legislation, Fisher has a good chance of prevailing against
the federal government, too. Also in his favor is a large body of federal
case law which repeatedly has adopted the American Rule of awarding
title to the finder.10
It is important to note that a bill is pending in Congress which, if
passed, could certainly change the course of this litigation, and treasure
law in general. H.R. 1195 provides that "any abandoned historic ship-
wreck located, in whole or in part, on the outer continental shelf...
is the property of the United States."' Inasmuch as this bill purports
to control shipwrecks outside the three-mile limit, it is in direct conflict
with the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.0 3 Thus, unless
modified, it is unlikely this bill will become law.
This bill and the pending case of the Almirante are certain to be
crucial factors as the law of treasure is reconsidered in the coming
years. Whether the bill should become law or Fisher's company be
awarded the Alnirante, are questions involving competing social poli-
99. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 524-25, citing United States v. Diaz,
449 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974):
Nowhere here do we find any definition of such terms as "ruin" or "monument"
(whether historic or prehistoric) or "object of antiquity." The statute does not
limit itself to Indian reservations or to Indian relics. Hobbyists who explore the
desert and its ghost towns for arrowheads and antique bottles could arguably
find themselves within the Act's proscriptions. 499 F.2d at 114. In our judgment
the statute, by use of undefined terms of uncommon usage, is fatally vague in
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. 499 F.2d at 115.
However, the Tenth Circuit recently rejected this reasoning and explicitly upheld the
constitutionality of the Act. The court held the law was not vague as applied. United
States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 84 (1979).
Moreover, Congress has recently passed legislation in an effort to cure the statute's
vagueness problem. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C.A. §
470aa (Supp. 1979).
100. Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F.Supp. at 909.
101. See cases cited note 43 supra.
102. H.R. 1195, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
103. Convention on the Continental Shelf, see note 29 supra. Note: the passage
of this bill would legislatively overrule the Fifth Circuit's decision in Treasure Salvor's
#2.
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cies and conflicting legal principles. The outcome will be interesting to
observe.
CONCLUSION
At the present time, case law supports the rights of a treasure
hunter to ownership of all the treasure he finds outside the jurisdiction
of the state. This principle embodies the American tradition of a fair
reward for an individual's work, and endeavors to restrain an ex-
panding modern bureaucracy from intruding into an area where per-
sonal property rights have traditionally prevailed. We approve of this
fair principle. Accordingly, we disapprove of the legislation proposed
by H.R. 1195 to the extent it gives the United States unwarranted own-
ership and improper jurisdiction over shipwrecks and treasure in inter-
national waters. Treasure hunters should be free to pursue their de-
manding and risky profession without government meddling.
Should a treasure hunter own the treasure he finds if it is within
the state's jurisdiction? We think so. A wreck lost and undiscovered is
the same whether it be one or five miles from the beach. The state
should not be enriched unjustly by the industry of the few who devote
themselves to the vicissitudes of search and recovery merely because a
discovery is near to the shore. The English notion of a sovereign pre-
rogative is misplaced in this context. If Fisher and his company found
the Almirante, they should own it.
Archaeological considerations also must be examined."0 4 Congress
has the power to regulate maritime matters, and more enlightened leg-
islation than that now pending should be created to strike a balance
between the need of the people to know their past and the right of
every person to a fair compensation for his or her chosen labour. In the
final analysis, however, we believe the American tradition of a just re-
ward is too important to be subordinated to any secondary
considerations.
104. For a discussion of these considerations, see Open Season On Ancient Ship-
wrecks preceding this comment.
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"A wise and frugal government .. . shall leave men otherwise
free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and
shall not take from the mouth of labour the bread it has earned - this
is the sum of good government.""1 5
Robert Kelley
Melanie May*
105. THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS.
Note: In regard to a frugal government, it is interesting that over $36,000,000 was
spent, not including the cost of litigation, during the course of the A tocha situation.
According to David Paul Horan, attorney for Treasure Salvors, Inc. $20,000,000 was
spent in the establishment of a Department of Underwater Archeaology through the
Department of the Interior. An additional $16,440,000.87 was spent in amending off-
shore oil leases to include a stipulation by which the federal government can require
the "lessee to conduct a cultural resources survey based on the probability zone maps"
prepared by the government. (This cost includes that of the lessees in compliance.)
Brief for Appellant, Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978), at 20.
* The authors would like to express their appreciation to Mr. Paul Horan,
attorney for Treasure Salvors, Inc., of Key West, Florida for his help in obtaining
information on the current status of this litigation.
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